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INTRODUCTION
Diverging perspectives are emerging on the issue of compulsory
licenses' amidst an array of controversy surrounding the recent dis-
pute between the South African Parliament and the United States
Trade Representative ("USTR").2 The confusion centers around the
interpretation of the World Trade Organization's ("WTO") Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
1. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the opposing views between devel-
oping nations like South Africa and developed nations like the United States).
2. See Robert Weissman, Symposium, INSIGHT MAG., Sept. 13, 1999, at 1, 1-2
[hereinafter Weissman, Symposium] (describing the opposition of the United States
to South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Act, which gives the South
African Health Minister the ability to issue compulsory licenses for drugs other-
wise not obtainable by the population).
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("TRIPs") 3 on the issuance of compulsory licenses of pharmaceutical
patents by governments in developing nations." While disputes be-
tween the governments of developed nations holding critical patents
and governments with most of the pharmaceutical needs are not
new,5 the issue of compulsory license remains an unresolved matter.'
Although some commentators assert that TRIPs needs to be
amended to clarify confusion on compulsory licensing,' a unique as-
pect of the WTO is that there already exists a conflict resolution
body, the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), established through the
Understanding on Dispute Settlement ("DSU"),' to resolve issues
3. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
[hereinafter TRIPs], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 66, para. 1, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
4. See Review of TRIPs, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Int'l Trade Rep.) at
D7 (June 9, 1999) (highlighting the recent controversy surrounding the interpreta-
tion of compulsory licensing in TRIPs).
5. See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 3-6 (1996) (noting dis-
agreements over pharmaceutical patents between the United States and Korea, In-
dia, Thailand, and Brazil from 1987 through 1992); see also Theresa Beeby Lewis,
Comment, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industr": A Survey of Patent
Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L L. 835, 859-64 (1996) (highlighting pharma-
ceutical patent disputes betveen the United States and Singapore, Costa Rica,
China, Egypt, Korea, and Thailand).
6. See Drugs: United States, EU Resistance to Compulsor. Drug Licensing
Draws Health Care Fire, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Int'l Trade Rep.) at D8
(Mar. 29, 1999) (reporting the meeting between activist groups and government
officials to engage in a global dialogue on the issue of compulsory licenses).
7. See Richard H. Marschall, Note, Patents. -Antitrust, and the WTO/GA TT:
Using TRIPs as a Vehicle for Antitrust Harmonization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1165, 1190 (1997) (calling for amendments to TRIPs that would limit the
broad escape clause permitting developing nations to use compulsory licenses in
favor of more narrow antitrust or anticompetition justifications).
8. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONs-THE LEGAL TEXTs 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (pro-
claiming in Article III, sec. 3 that one of the functions of the WTO is to administer
the dispute settlement body); see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3(2), Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS
404 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1126 [hereinafter DSU].
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arising under TRIPs. 9 The primary problem, however, arises when
nations in a dispute fail to involve the DSB in resolving their prob-
lem because they are either wary of damaging relations with an im-
portant trading partner' or fearful that their position will not with-
stand the TRIPs." Yet, as the WTO gains legitimacy through
increased involvement in dispute settlements,'2 the probability is high
that the issue of compulsory licensing will arrive before the DSB. "
Accordingly, for the sake of future dispute resolutions on the
matter of compulsory licensing, this Comment seeks to review the
WTO treatment of compulsory licenses in Article 2, Section 5 of
TRIPs. While this Comment's basic premise is that nations can save
time and resources by resolving intellectual property disputes
through the WTO's dispute resolution system, 4 it also recognizes
9. See World Trade Organization-Committee on Trade and Development, De-
veloping Countries and the Uruguay Round: An Overview 20 (visited Sept. 25,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/ldc2 _512.htm> (describing the features of
the DSU and its particular benefits to developing nations); see also Ernesto M. Hi-
zon, Virtual Reality and Reality: The East Asian NICS and the Global Trading
System, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 81 (1999) (arguing generally that the
DSB is a more litigious body than previous multilateral dispute resolution bodies).
10. See Hizon, supra note 9, at 126 (noting the existence of threatening bilat-
eral trade measures that enforce dispute settlement outside of the WTO's DSB).
11. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (quoting the statement of Rep.
Sanders suggesting that the United States hesitated in bringing the issue before the
WTO due to the uncertainty of its success).
12. See Hizon, supra note 9, at 120 (showing that the DSU has thus far been
successful in attracting and serving the needs of countries in all stages). Of the 157
requests made to the DSB, 88 were filed by developed nations and 29 were filed by
developing nations. See id. But see Kim Van Der Borght, The Review of the WTO
Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1226, 1242 (noting recent criticisms of the DSM including
how the Appellate Body is involved in too many Panel reviews and how an over-
emphasis on free trade subordinates other worthy causes like the environment and
consumer rights).
13. See Review of TRIPs, supra note 4, at D7 (reporting that the nations of
Kenya, Jamaica, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia recently submitted a
joint paper to the WTO calling for a review of TRIPs provisions to ensure that
their nations retain access to pharmaceutical products through compulsory licens-
ing).
14. See Hizon, supra note 9, at 118-19 (offering a pessimistic perspective on
the ability of GATT dispute resolution mechanisms to succeed amidst a lack of
agreement on the values and rules being enforced).
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that this will not always be a certain option as long as ambiguities in
the TRIPs language exist.'" This Comment endeavors to alleviate
some of the confusion surrounding compulsory licensing and to rec-
ommend an interpretation of the Article 31 language in TRIPs that
would satisfy broad interests. 6
Part I of this Comment introduces compulsory licenses and the
emergence of the TRIPs Agreement. In addition, Part I examines the
recent trade dispute between South Africa and the United States by
exemplifying how recent confusion over the meaning and purpose of
compulsory licensing can present a complicated issue for trade part-
ners. Next, Part II examines relevant provisions in the TRIPs Agree-
ment concerning compulsory licensing, amidst the backdrop of the
Paris Convention. Part III briefly explores contrasting policy objec-
tives for the use of compulsory licensing by comparing the perspec-
tives of developing nations and developed nations. Finally, Part IV
recommends that future DSB panels strike a balance between the
needs of both perspectives to ensure the continued legitimacy of the
DSB and the WTO.
I. BACKGROUND
A. COMPULSORY LICENSES
Compulsory licensing is defined generally as the granting of a li-
cense by a government to use a patent without the patent-holder's
permission. 7 As applied to international intellectual property rights,
it allows governments to grant licenses for patent use in situations
where the patent-holder is either not using the patent within the
country or is not using it adequately.' Although compulsory licens-
ing is not a new concept,'9 it recently has received considerable at-
15. See infra Parts II.B.2 and III (examining ambiguous terminology in TRIPs
and the vast spectrum of potential interpretations thereof).
16. See infra Part IV.B.2-3 (opining that balancing the interests of both devel-
oped and developing nations will provide the broadest legitimacy to the DSB deci-
sion).
17. See Review of TRIPs, supra note 4, at D7 (defining compulsory licenses).
18. See Beeby Lewis, supra note 5, at 845 (applying the definition of compul-
sory licensing to intellectual property concerns).
19. See Weissman, Symposium, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that compulsory Ii-
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tention as pharmaceutical companies and activist groups seek to ad-
vance their respective political agendas over the right to drug access
for life-threatening diseases.20
When governments issue compulsory licenses, the result is often a
sharp decrease in prices, similar to the introduction of other com-
petitive forces like generic drugs.2' For this reason, many developing
nations argue for the right to issue compulsory licenses for pharma-
ceuticals that are normally very expensive for their citizens." During
the negotiations for the TRIPs agreement, however, most developed
nations argued for harsh restrictions on compulsory licenses to safe-
guard their domestic industries.23 Thus, an ostensible tension among
developing and developed nations is mounting over the use of com-
pulsory licenses.
B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (TRIPS)
Following many years of uncertainty and discomfort concerning
intellectual property, the General Agreement on Trade & Tariffs
("GATT")2 4 established jurisdiction over international enforcement
censing is common practice around world, even in the United States). When patent
holders apply for and obtain patents, they are aware of the use of compulsory li-
censes. See id.
20. See 145 CONG. REc. H6027 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (statements of Rep.
Gilman, Rep. Sanders, and Rep. Menendez) (highlighting the perspectives of both
the AIDS activists and the pharmaceutical concerns during a debate over H.R.
2415, a proposed amendment to The American Embassy Security Act of 1999).
21. See AIDS Drugs Policy: Africa Policy Information Center, Afr. News Serv.
(BRC) (Sept. 7, 1999) (estimating that compulsory licensing can lower prices of
medicines by more than 75%). But see Gianna Julian-Amold, International Com-
pulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 364 (1993) (ar-
guing that a more likely result of issuing compulsory licenses is an increase in
profits to the local generic pharmaceutical industry and no decrease in prices for
consumers).
22. See Review of TRIPs, supra note 4, at D7 (noting the apprehension of de-
veloping nations on losing their right to issue compulsory licenses).
23. See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the
TRIPs Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries To-
ward the Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 61 (1998)
(highlighting the intense debate on the issue of compulsory licenses during TRIPs
negotiations).
24. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I I,
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of intellectual property rights in a declaration to promote multilateral
negotiations on the topic. ' Reaching a consensus was not easy.2' De-
veloping nations consistently questioned the need for an additional
multilateral intellectual property agreement,2' while developed na-
tions aggressively argued the need for a multilateral enforcement
body.? Many United States pharmaceutical companies closely
monitored the negotiations, raising issues and protests whenever pat-
ent language did not seem to reinforce their "rights." Influenced by
the powerful pharmaceutical lobby, the United States noted its posi-
tion on pharmaceutical patents by simultaneously punishing nations
it believed were lacking intellectual property provisions through the
use of the Special 301.30 Under the Special 301 threat, the United
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
25. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 3 (providing a historical account of the
adoption of the TRIPs agreement).
26. See id. at 4 (noting the many complicating layers involved in constructing
the TRIPs agreement).
27. See id. (highlighting the disagreements set forth by India and Brazil for the
need of another intellectual property organization aside from the existing World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")).
28. See id. at 7 (outlining the development of the negotiations from the insis-
tence of developed nations, led by the United States).
29. See id. (noting the influence of pharmaceutical companies in the negotia-
tion process); see also Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceu-
tical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global hItellectual Propery Rules, and the Re-
maining WTO Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. IN'L
ECON. L. 1069, 1086-87 (1996) [hereinafter Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs]
(illustrating how pharmaceutical companies characterized pharmaceutical patents
as "rights" during legal discussions, thus successfully elevating their status to new
moral highs).
30. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified in multiple sections of 19 U.S.C.). Compare
Y. Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting United States
Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206, 228
(1994) (noting the United States policy to use Special 301 and disagreeing with the
utility of such unilateral actions), and Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs, supra
note 29, at 1078 (noting the United States primarily has used Special 301 against
developing nations that have developed threatening pharmaceutical industries in
their own nations), and Robert J. Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Protection
for Intellectual Property: the United States "TRIPs " Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 179, 202-03 (1998) (commenting on how, despite the need for the
United States to use Special 301, due to the inadequacies in TRIPs, its use violates
the WTO Agreements), with Alan C. Swan, "Fairness " and "Reciprocity"" in the
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States either threatens to or does revoke a nation's Most Favored
Nation ("MFN") status until appropriate changes are made to their
intellectual property safeguards.3' Amidst all of the special interests,
the TRIPs agreement was adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round in Marrakesh in April 1994.32
Creating the WTO and entering into the TRIPs Agreement was a
major accomplishment for the reconciliation of trade priorities
among both developing and developed nations.33 Although TRIPs
emerged from vivid negotiations, there were high hopes for multilat-
eral methods to trump bilateral bullying.34 At the onset, it was appar-
ent that TRIPs initially would cost developing countries money,' but
it also was speculated that the long-term benefits would help nurture
the emergence of pharmaceutical industries in developing countries
to ultimately reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals."
International Trade Section 301 and the Rule of Law, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 37 (1999) (discussing recent changes in Section 301 that make it less of an in-
trusive instrument and more of an instigator of an open global economy).
31. See Chang, supra note 30, at 206 (noting how the United States uses Sec-
tion 301 as a stick amidst the carrot of trade privileges).
32. See BLAKENEY supra note 5, at 7 (pointing out the final signing of the
TRIPs agreement).
33. See G. Bruce Doern, Global Change and Intellectual Property Agencies:
An Institutional Perspective, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 101 (John de la Mothe ed., 1999) (postulating that TRIPs has
altered the configurations of both power and partnership among intellectual prop-
erty entities).
34. See Marschall, supra note 7, at 1188 (noting high hopes for multilateralism
to limit the need for bilateral actions). The author also postulates that the vague
and broad exceptions under the TRIPs agreement may have provided incentive for
the developing nations to sign the agreement. See id. at 1189.
35. See World Trade Organization-Committee on Trade and Development, su-
pra note 9, at 17 (warning developing nations of new requirements in the text of
the TRIPs, which will increase the prices of certain goods, such as pharmaceuticals
and agricultural products).
36. See Wendy S. Vicente, Comment, Questionable Victory for Coerced Ar-
gentine Pharmaceutical Patent Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1101
(1998) (discussing the effects of TRIPs on Argentina and the reality of interna-
tional patent agreements on the development of pharmaceutical industries in de-
veloping nations). But see Christopher S. Mayer, Note, The Brazilian Pharmaceu-
tical Industry Goes Walking From Impanema to Prosperity: Will the New
Intellectual Property Law Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 377, 381 (1998) (noting how United States patent law principles incorporated
[15:941
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Although TRIPs incorporates portions of the Paris Convention, the
Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, and the Treaty on Intel-
lectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits," the patent provi-
sions are notably new to international intellectual property law.'"
Without terming it such, TRIPs allows for compulsory licensing
amidst several provisions in Article 3 1.'
C. CURRENT CONFUSION OVER COMPULSORY LICENSING:
EXAMPLE OF THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICA-UNITED STATES
TRADE DISPUTE
1. Overviews'
Since the inception of the TRIPs Agreement, increasing numbers
of intellectual property disputes have been brought before the dispute
settlement mechanism.4° One issue that has not been argued before
into TRIPs and generally enforced by other unilateral acts actually have enabled
United States pharmaceutical companies to gain a stronger monopoly on pharma-
ceutical products and processes around the globe).
37. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part I, art. 2, sec. 1-2 (noting that members of
TRIPs should comply with the Paris Convention and that nothing in TRIPs takes
away from existing obligations in the other international treaties); see also Robert
J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Proper . and International
Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows of a Match Made in Heaven?,
47 BUFF. L. REv. 713, 720-24 (1999) (discussing the uncertainties inherent in the
Paris Convention and the Berne Convention).
38. See McCabe, supra note 23, at 43 (noting the new patent provisions intro-
duced in the TRIPs).
39. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31 (authorizing laws of a mem-
ber nation that allow "for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government" under certain conditions); see also World Trade
Organization-Committee on Trade and Development, supra note 9, at 18 (articu-
lating to developing countries that, "[d]etailed conditions are laid down for com-
pulsory licensing or governmental use of patents without the authorization of the
patent owner").
40. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 17 (1999) (find-
ing that the number of disputes brought before the WTO during the first three years
of its existence was ninety percent higher than the number of cases brought before
the old GATT dispute settlement mechanism). Furthermore, during the first three
years of its inception, the number of cases brought against developing nations as
defendants has tripled. See id. at 24.
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the DSB is that of compulsory licenses." Thus, when South Africa
recently introduced legislation to allow the Health Minister to issue
compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, the United States inter-
preted those actions to be in violation of intellectual property stan-
dards in TRIPs, and threatened trade sanctions." Although the South
African government never conceded to any violation of TRIPs, the
two governments finally did settle the matter quietly, without the in-
volvement of the WTO's DSB.43
2. South African Perspective
a. Overview of National Health Crisis
Although South Africa has come a long way since its conversion
into a new democracy in April 1994, the nation still faces tremen-
dous obstacles in the areas of economic disparities and health care. 4
41. See World Trade Organization-Committee on Trade and Development, su-
pra note 9, at 18 (declaring that compulsory licensing is allowed under TRIPs).
This official declaration supports the view by many that compulsory licensing is
clearly legal and need not come before the DSB. But see Review of TRIPs, supra
note 4, at D7 (noting that several nations have recently called for a review of
TRIPs to clarify the rights of nations on this matter).
42. See Consumer Project on Technology, U.S. Department of State Report:
U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination, or withdrawal of
Article 15(c) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1965
(visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdeptfeb5I999.html>
[hereinafter State Department Report on South African Act] (finding that the
United States "joined with other USG agencies with trade responsibility to insist
on this [Special 301 Watch List] designation in the hope that this special attention
would spur South Africa to change or withdraw Article 15(c)").
43. See infra notes 51, 64 and accompanying text (noting how the two nations
resolved their trade perspectives by diplomatic means). But see Simon Barber, U.S.
Remains Hostile to South Africa Drugs Act, AFR. NEWS SERV. (BRC) (Sept. 27,
1999) (reporting that the South African Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Erwin,
told interviewers that, while an agreement was reached between the two nations
concerning the trade policy objectives, the United States has not accepted the trade
practices used to achieve those policies).
44. See U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Republic of South Af-
rica-Released by the Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
(last modified Feb. 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/
southafrica_0298_bgn.html> (noting that in South Africa, "economic disparities
between population groups are expected to persist for many years" and "violence
against women and children is a serious problem"); see also AIDS Coalition to
950 [15:941
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One of the greatest threats to the South African population is Auto
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), currently affecting one-
eighth of its citizens." Even more troubling is the lack of advanced
medicines available to those affected.' Although AIDS-infected citi-
zens in developed nations can receive an array of medicines to delay
the onset of symptoms,' 7 many physicians in South Africa do not
mention those remedies to their patients because they know that the
patients cannot afford the drugs.'
Unleash Power, Candidate Gore Zaps (visited Sept. 7, 1999)
<http://wvww.actupny.orglactions /gorezaps.html> [hereinafter ACT-UP] (estimat-
ing that twenty percent of all pregnant women in South Africa are HIV-positive).
45. See AIDS Drugs Policy: Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 21
(noting statistics on the infection rate of AIDS in South Africa); see also Peter
Hawthorne, A Blighted Generation Southern Africa Has Been Most Severely Hit by
AIDS, Leaving Children Orphaned and the Workforce Depleted, TIME INr'L, July
26, 1999, at 57 (reporting that almost twenty percent of South Africa's workforce
will likely be HIV positive by the year 2000).
46. See ACT-UP, supra note 44 (explaining that the South African Health
Minister came under attack by AIDS activists when she cancelled pilot projects for
AZT at prenatal clinics due to a lack of funding). While the epicenter of the AIDS
epidemic is occurring in Third World nations, most people there cannot afford the
sophisticated drugs used to treat the disease. See id.
47. See PhRMA, More Than 120 New Medicines in Development for AIDS:
AIDS Death Rate Down 16 Percent from '95 to '96 (last modified Nov. 1997)
<http://www.phrma.org/facts/phfacts/l I_97a.htmi> [hereinafter PhRMA: New
Medicines] (reporting that the new breakthroughs in AIDS medications are ena-
bling sufferers in the United States to live longer lives with fewer infections). Ac-
cording to PhRMA, the number of AIDS-related deaths plunged twenty-six percent
from 1995 to 1996 due to new combination drug therapies and better access to
health care. See id. Cf William Dowell, Ethics and AIDS Drugs: Some Countries
Want to Suspend Patent and Trade Laws to Get Lower-cost Afedications to the
Poor, TIME MAG., July 12, 1999, at 49 (speculating that the AIDS virus may soon
be reduced to a chronic disease instead of a deadly disease, due to the influx of
pioneering pharmaceutical breakthroughs).
48. See Debra Rosenberg & John Barry, No Money No Meds: South Africa
Needs Access to Cheap AIDS Medicine, But Drug Companies Want a Say in WVhat
They Get and How They Get It, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1999, at 32 (reporting how
doctors at Rietvlie Hospital in the Eastern Cape do not disclose the availability of
AIDS treatments, as a gesture of kindness to their dying patients who would not be
able to afford the pharmaceuticals on their meager incomes); see also ACT-UP,
supra note 44 (estimating that the average South African income nears S2600Iyear
while the cost of the pharmaceuticals manufactured in the United States is near
$12,000/year); Claire Bisseker, SA in Race to Develop an iffordable Vaccine:
AIDS Research, FINANCIAL MAIL at 38 (Feb. 5, 1999) (reporting that the triple
cocktail therapy is not affordable to the South African population).
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b. Medicines & Related Substances Act
Responding to the AIDS crisis in 1997, the South African Parlia-
ment proposed the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act,49 which would allow the South African Health
Minister to override patent rights to allow compulsory licensing and
parallel importing." By issuing compulsory licenses, the Health
Minister hoped to reduce the price of influential AIDS pharmaceuti-
cals and make them more affordable to the population.' Notably, the
stated purpose of the Amendment was to reduce the cost of pharma-
ceuticals to protect the health of the public. 2
South Africa had good reason to believe that the issuance of com-
pulsory licenses would cause prices to decrease for desperately
needed pharmaceuticals. Several other nations have used this
49. See Republic of South Africa, Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act No. 90 1997 (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http:
//www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1997/act9O.pdf'>. The proposed legislation
in 15(c) provides:
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the pub-
lic, and in particular may-(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act. No. 57 of 1978), determine that
the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Re-
public shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been
put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her con-
sent....
Id.
50. See State Department Report on South African Act, supra note 42 (de-
scribing the effect of the proposed South African Amendment on patent rights for
pharmaceuticals).
51. See Governments of South Africa and the USA Reach Joint Agreement,
South African Press Association (Sept. 18, 1999) (quoting Tshediso Matona, Di-
rector for Bilateral Trade Relations in the Department of Trade and Industry, as
saying that the agreement would enable ordinary people to buy medicines
cheaply).
52. See Republic of South Africa, supra note 49 (stating that the Minister may
decree situations where cheaper drugs are needed).
53. See Nathan Ford & Daniel Berman, AIDS and Essential Medicines and
Compulsomy Licensing 2 (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www. cptech.org/march99-
cl/reportl.html> (finding that the AIDS drug AZT costs $239 per month in the
United States while costing only $48 per month in India, where pharmaceutical
production currently is unregulated).
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method successfully, even at the disapproval of highly industrialized
nations.
3. United States' Perspective
a. General Objections to Compulsory Licensing
However, the United States strongly opposes the issuance of com-
pulsory licenses for many reasons." The United States has discour-
aged the use of compulsory licenses for various altruistic reasons, in-
cluding the promotion of scientific research and development
industries in developing nations, 6 the protection of the sick popula-
tion from inappropriate administration of potent pharmaceuticals,"
54. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 4-6 (noting many nations who have in-
fringed on patent restrictions to enable the use of expensive pharmaceuticals); see
also Beeby Lewis, supra note 5, at 859-64 (noting that multiple nations are in dis-
pute with the United States for violating pharmaceutical patent provisions); C/.
Vicente, supra note 36, at 1132 (noting how discarding its ability to use compul-
sory licenses drove up the cost of pharmaceuticals in Canada, estimated to cost the
nation an extra S7 billion by the year 2010).
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (highlighting the wide array
of excuses, both protectionist and altruistic).
56. See Vicente, supra note 36, at 1131 (noting how the United States has justi-
fied its position against compulsory licenses by referring to the need to help de-
velop a science and technology infrastructure for pharmaceuticals in developing
nations). But see Aphaluck Bhatiasevi, Erperts Fear Impact Front ITO Terms:
Poor Could Be Denied Access to New Drugs, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 19, 1999, at 4
(noting that the TRIPs agreement has not encouraged transfer of technology of
pharmaceutical companies into Thailand, but instead encouraged importing of ex-
pensive drugs from monopolies in Western societies); cf DOMINIQUE FORAY,
Knowledge Distribution and the Institutional Infrastructure, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL COMPETITION: TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS 85-
87 (Horst Albach & Stephanie Rosenkranz eds., 1995) (noting that any patent pol-
icy based entirely on creating vast new innovations, without acknowledging the
importance of collaborating existing knowledge to develop smaller steps along the
path, automatically leads to re-enforcement of the patent-holder's protection).
57. See REP. CALLAHAN, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND
RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, H. REP. No. 105-719, at 33 (1998)
(expressing the concerns of the House Appropriations Committee that the compul-
sory licensing scheme of Section 15(c) of the Medicines and Related Substances
Act threatens the health of South Africans by potentially allowing sub-standard
and counterfeit products to be placed on the market). But see ACT-UP, supra note
44 (acknowledging the issue of pharmaceutical safety and noting that it is better
monitored as a regulatory issue instead of a trade issue).
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and the allegiance to international treaties enforcing the policy of in-
tellectual property rights. 8 Yet, the most consistent complaint by the
United States is that compulsory licenses violate international intel-
lectual property law proscribed in the TRIPs agreement."
b. Confusing Legal Objections With Policy Objections to
Compulsory Licensing
The USTR's response to South Africa's proposed amendment con-
firmed the United States' opposition to compulsory licensing.' On
the one hand, threatened sanctions were not surprising given the im-
mense financial threat that compulsory licenses present to United
States pharmaceutical companies." Nonetheless, the manner in
which the USTR set forth its objections revealed how the pharma-
ceutical industry has exerted pressure on the United States to adhere
to a different standard other than that agreed in the international
TRIPs agreement. 2 As a result rampant confusion currently exists in
58. See 145 CONG. REC. H6027 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Gilman) (asserting that the implementation of section 15 (c) would put the United
Sates in violation of TRIPs for failing to "seek the strengthening of intellectual
property laws").
59. See Actions by United States Trade Representative, 19 U.S.C. sec. 2411
(d)(3)(i)(II)(1994) (authorizing the United States Trade Representative to take ac-
tions to protect against unreasonable acts, which "denies fair and equitable provi-
sion of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights notwith-
standing the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific
obligations of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. . ."); see also
State Department Report on South African Act, supra note 45 (stating that "Nev-
ertheless, United States Government experts determined that provisions of Article
15 (c) authorize action clearly inconsistent with South Africa's obligations under
TRIPs").
60. See Consumer Project on Technology, CPT's June 29, 1999 Letter to the
Congressional Black Caucus regarding African/AIDS/patent trade dispute (visited
Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.cptech.org/ip /health/sa/clybum.html> [hereinafter
CPT's Letter to Cong. Black Caucus] (noting how the USTR, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, and the United States Department of State are cur-
rently engaged in the practice of pressuring South Africa and other countries on
issues surrounding pharmaceutical patents).
61. See Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs, supra note 29, at 1075-1077 (high-
lighting the aggressive nature of the pharmaceutical industry's lobbying in Wash-
ington, D.C. and the numerous government bureaucrats with prior experience in
powerful positions of pharmaceutical companies).
62. See Ford & Berman, supra note 53, at 2 (quoting Lois Boland of the United
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United States Government agencies over the legality of compulsory
licensing in TRIPs.63
4. A Negotiated Settlement, Absent the Influence of the H'TO
Recently, the United States and South Africa resolved their trade
disagreement through bilateral political negotiations,' attracting un-
flattering claims that the United States was using its economic power
to bully the developing nation. 6' In the agreement, the United States
States Patent & Trademark Office) ("We acknowledge that our position is more
restrictive than the TRIPs agreement but we see TRIPs as a minimum standard of
protection.").
63. See Intellectual Property: U.S. Cites Problems with India's Patent Law; No
Plans to File Complaint, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. 759 (BNA) (May 5, 1999) (quoting
United States Ambassador to the WTO, Rita Hayes as saying, -[t]he United States
believes that the TRIPs agreement does not permit WTO members to grant com-
pulsory licenses or impose other exceptions or limitations on exclusive marketing
rights"); see also CPT's Letter to Cong. Black Caucus, supra note 60 (quoting Lois
Boland of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, "[A] compulsory li-
censing provision in a given law that would affect certain categories of inventions,
such as pharmaceuticals, would not be consistent with Article (a) of Article 31,
which requires that 'authorization... shall be considered on its individual mer-
its."'). But see id. (quoting the text of a letter from Vice President Gore to James E.
Clybum, which states that South Africa's efforts to enhance health care for its
population may include compulsory licensing as long as they comply with interna-
tional agreements).
64. See Department of Trade and Industry, Joint Understanding Between the
Governments of South Africa and The United States of America (visited Sept. 18,
1999) <http://vww.polity.org.za/govdocs /pr/1999/pro9176.html> (noting that the
resolution to the trade dispute between South Africa and the United States was re-
solved through the exchange of views of both governments); see also Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, United
States-South Africa Understanding on Intellectual Properly (visited Sept. 18,
1999) <http://vww.ustr. gov.releases/1999/09/99-76.html> (highlighting the new
understanding between the governments and asserting that the United States is
committed to helping South Africa solve its AIDS problem). But see Activists Look
Gore Out of His Office, Afr. News Serv. (BRC) (Aug. 25, 1999) (noting the
speculations by AIDS activists that the Clinton Administration insisted upon com-
pulsory licensing concessions only for AIDS drugs and not for other needed phar-
maceuticals, despite the fact that the exact trade agreement arrangements have not
yet been disclosed).
65. See Int'l Trade Daily News, supra note 6, at D8 (reporting the condemna-
tions of the United States and the EU by Medecins Sans Frontiers Health Action
International, ACT-UP for adopting provisions to prevent developing nations from
implementing compulsory licensing schemes).
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agreed to relax its trade pressures on South Africa by acknowledging
the special circumstances inherent in the AIDS epidemic. While both
nations reaffirmed their policy objectives to mutual satisfaction," it is
unclear if the United States' position actually acknowledged the le-
gality of compulsory licensing or whether it merely backed down due
to harsh political pressure. 7 Consequently the higher authority of the
DSB did not resolve the question of whether compulsory licenses are
legal under the TRIPs and no precedent was set for future disputes.
II. ANALYSIS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING IN
TRIPS
To fully appreciate the current debate ensuing about compulsory
licensing for pharmaceuticals, it is necessary to analyze the treatment
of the subject in the international agreement, TRIPs. A full analysis
includes a summary of the relevant portions of the Paris Convention
as it applies to the compulsory licenses provision in TRIPs and the
language describing the use of compulsory licenses finally adopted
in TRIPs.
69
66. See Barber, supra note 43 (noting the mutual policy goals of upholding in-
tellectual property rights and achieving affordable health care).
67. See Activists Look Gore Out of His Office, supra note 64 (reporting that
AIDS activists accused Vice President Al Gore of implementing a political face-
saving measure by allowing South Africa to use compulsory licensing, while rais-
ing questions of how this issue may be applied to other nations). During a Con-
gressional Hearing, Joe Popovich, a representative from the USTR, stated that the
administration was willing to relax the trade policy against compulsory licensing
for only AIDS drugs. See id. See also James Love, Five Common Mistakes byv Re-
porters Covering the US/South Africa Disputes Over Compulsory Licensing and
Parallel Imports 1 (last modified Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www .cptech.org/ip/
health/salmistakes.html> (finding that among several mistakes made by the press
was the idea that South Africa backed down and abandoned plans to permit com-
pulsory licensing, when it was the United States that ended its trade pressures).
68. See 145 CONG. REC. H6027 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Sanders) ("The State Department does not want to challenge [the South African
government] in the World Trade Organization because they will lose.").
69. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 3(2) (noting the role of the DSB is "... to pre-
serve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law"); see also Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 31.2, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (specifying
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A. PARIS CONVENTION
The TRIPs Agreement notes that its patent provisions must com-
ply with the Paris Convention of 1967.0 Under the Paris Conven-
tion,7' the term "patent" is interpreted broadly to encompass all forms
of patent laws created within its member nations.': At the outset, the
Paris Convention sought to eliminate unequal treatment by any na-
tion's domestic laws toward foreign patent holders through the "Na-
tional Treatment" provision in Article 2. 7' For example, the Conven-
tion promulgated that it be necessary to treat foreign patent holders
equally for patent fees, patent terms, and the time period within
which the patent holder must work the patent to avoid the granting of
compulsory licenses."
In addition, the Paris Convention contains limited and controver-
that the interpretation of a treaty must be done "'in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.. ").
70. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part I, art. 2, secs. 1-2 (noting that the Paris Con-
vention applies to Parts I, III, IV of the agreement).
71. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14,
1967, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17
(Michael Leaffer ed., 1999) [hereinafter Paris Convention] (creating a multilateral
agreement for intellectual property rights and duties based on the principals of na-
tional treatment, right of priority, and uniform rules).
72. See id. at 20 (defining patent in Article 1, sec.4 as including "various kinds
of industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of the Union"); see
also STEPHEN A. BENT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 400-01 (1987) (noting that the definition is pur-
posely broad to include all types of industrial patents).
73. See Paris Convention, supra note 71, at 20 (stating that in Article 2 that na-
tionals of any member country of the Convention shall enjoy the rights included
under any other member nations' laws); see also Gutowski, supra note 37, at 718
(distinguishing the concept of "national treatment" from the concept of "reciprocal
treatment," where foreign parties in a nation only receive equal treatment as com-
pared to how foreigners are treated in their own nation).
74. See BENT ET AL., supra note 72, at 401-02 (finding that these were the very
concepts for which developing nations did not want to provide equal treatment for
foreign patent holders). But see Mayer, supra note 36. at 382 (asserting the nega-
tive role of the national treatment provision in the Paris Convention). National
treatment allowed member nations to implement very low levels of intellectual
property protection as long as foreigners were treated similarly, thus opening the
door for nations like Brazil to eliminate all domestic patent protection. See id. at
382.
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sial terms for the regulation of compulsory licenses. 5 Under the Paris
Convention, compulsory licenses are permitted to solve the problem
of underutilized patents. 7' Notably, the Convention creates time re-
strictions before an application for a compulsory license can be sub-
mitted and creates limitations of licenses when the patentee can jus-
tify insufficient usage." Yet, the language concerning the
justifications for inaction is vague, leaving room open for alternative
interpretations.78
B. WTO TRIPS DOCUMENT
Complementing the language in the Paris Convention, TRIPs
never mentions the phrase "compulsory license" throughout its text. 7
Yet, Article 31 describes an allowable exception to patent enforce-
ment in language implying compulsory licensing."
75. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 89 (noting that Article 5A of the Paris
Convention was one of the most controversial parts of the agreement).
76. See Paris Convention, supra note 71, at 24 (stating in Article 5, sec. A(3)
that the problem of misuse also can be addressed by forfeiture of the patent, but
only after the compulsory licenses process has been attempted).
77. See id. at 24. Article 5, sec. A(4) states:
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to
work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from
the date of filing of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last;
it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate rea-
sons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not be
transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with
that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.
Id.; see also BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 89 (defining the legitimate reasons as
those pertaining to legal, economic, or technical hurdles to utilizing the patent).
78. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 89 (finding that the provisions are un-
clear).
79. See CPTs Letter to Cong. Black Caucus, supra note 60 (noting that while
TRIPs do not contain the phrase compulsory license in its terminology, trade ex-
perts agree that it allows for compulsory licensing in Article 31); see also
BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 90 (noting that there is no specific reference to the
reasoning of inadequate use of patent, as made in the Paris Convention).
80. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31. The relevant text reads:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following
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I. Conditions for Compulsory' Licensing
Article 31 sets forth a series of guidelines member nations must
respect prior to implementing compulsory licenses."' Section (a)
notes that authorization of compulsory licensing should be consid-
ered on its merits." Section (b) conditions the granting of compul-
sory licenses on an initial attempt to obtain authorization by the pat-
ent holder through commercial terms and failure to obtain an
agreement within a reasonable amount of time."' Furthermore, this
provision permits waivers in situations of national emergency or ex-
treme urgency.84 Section (c) limits the use of the compulsory licens-
ing scheme to the purpose for which it was initially authorized."
Section (d) notes that the compulsory license will not be exclusive'
and Section (e) notes that it will not be assignable." Section (f) pro-
scribes that use of the license shall be predominantly for domestic
market use." Section (g) authorizes use of compulsory licenses only
during the time that the circumstances for its creation still exist, and
"competent authority" shall have the power to review the continua-
tion of the compulsory licenses.' Section (h) ascribes proper pay-
ment to the patent holder, based on the economic value of the com-
pulsory licensing scheme.90 Section (i) notes that the decision to
authorize compulsory licenses is subject to judicial review' and Sec-
provisions shall be respected. "Other use" refers to use other than that
allowed under Article 30.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. TRIPs Part II, sec. 5, art. 27(2) (providing ex-
ceptions to patent enforcement to prevent commercial exploitation to protect public
order and morality); art. 27(3)(a) (providing exceptions to patent enforcement for
diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods of treating humans).
81. See id. art. 31(a)-().
82. See id. art. 3 1(a).
83. See id. art. 31 (b).
84. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(b).
85. See id. art. 3 1(c).
86. See id. art. 3 1(d).
87. See id. art. 31 (e).
88. Seeid. art. 31(f).
89. See id. art. 3 1(g).
90. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(h).
91. See id. art. 31(i).
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tion (j) explains that the payment to the patent holder is also subject
to judicial review by a "distinct higher authority in that member". 2
Finally, Section (k) comments that special consideration should be
given in cases where the patent holder is engaged in anti-competitive
acts.93
2. Ambiguous Terminology
Essentially, Article 31 provides for a distinct balancing act, estab-
lishing a government's right to issue compulsory licenses,' while
attempting to safeguard the rights of the patent-holder whenever pos-
sible.95 Some analysts have suggested that Section (h) set forth the
greatest controversy in the Article 31 language 96 due to its ambiguity
on the issue of determining the proper economic value of the com-
pulsory license.97 While this Section arguably necessitates the strong-
est use of the balancing test to weigh the economic concerns of the
patent holder against the economic capabilities of the license grantor,
it is not beyond the ability of the DSB to do so."'
Yet, the ambiguous language in Article 31 that is likely to cause
most of the debate over compulsory licensing is the vague use of the
92. See id. art. 31(j).
93. See id. art. 31(k). Article 31 concludes with provision (I), which applies to
second patent issues. See id. art. 3 1(1).
94. See Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs, supra note 29, at 1113 (commenting
that the conditions in Article 31 provide little difficulty for establishing an efficient
compulsory licensing scheme).
95. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31 (c), (d), (e), and (g) (outlin-
ing strict restrictions for use of compulsory licenses, notification procedures, and
royalties to benefit the patent holder).
96. See Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs, supra note 29, at 1114 (finding that
provision (h) provides a critical obstacle to adopting a compulsory licensing pro-
gram for a developing nation).
97. See id. (noting that there is no single economic value of a compulsory li-
cense).
98. See World Trade Organization-Committee on Trade and Development, su-
pra note 9, at 19 (highlighting the features of the new dispute settlement mecha-
nism as contributing to the impartiality and legitimacy of the DSB). The DSB uses
a negative consensus approach so that a consensus is needed to halt the proceed-
ings instead of continuing them, and there is also the opportunity for an appellate
review of any decision before the panel's decisions become binding. See id.
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terms "circumstances" in Sections (b) and (g)" and "purpose" in
Section (c)."° First, the requirement to obtain permission from the
patent holder is waived in cases of national emergency or "other cir-
cunstances of extreme urgency."""1 Section (g) notes that the licens-
ing scheme should end when the "circumstances which led to it"
conclude.'0 2 Similarly, Section (c) limits the duration and scope of the
compulsory license to the "purpose for which it was authorized.""
The essential problem is that the factors contributing to the legiti-
mate need to issue compulsory licenses are not fully developed
within the text of Article 31 Without clarity in the language, na-
tions are likely to evade the issue of compulsory licensing, fearful of
the unknown.'°
While the WTO has yet to consider the issue of compulsory li-
censes for patents in relation to Article 31,'" it has mentioned the
term in two panel decisions regarding the marketing of patents in
Pakistan and India on other matters. 0 7 As the WTO endeavors to es-
99. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(b) and (g).
100. See id. art. 3 1(c).
101. See id. art. 31(b) (emphasis added).
102. See id. art. 3 1(g) (emphasis added).
103. See id. art. 3 1(c) (emphasis added).
104. See Marschall, supra note 7, at 1188-89 (characterizing the ambiguous lan-
guage in TRIPs as nebulous and full of loopholes).
105. See id. at 1193 (demonstrating how one drawback of a flexible approach to
TRIPs language is that it may create uncertainty for member nations).
106. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part VI (providing for additional time allotments
to developing nations to pass appropriate legislation and regulations to meet the
TRIPs agreements). Yet, under Article 65, a nation is obliged to ensure that any
changes its government undertakes do not result in a lesser degree of complicity
with the TRIPs agreement. See id. TRIPs Part VI, art. 65(5); see also Weissman, A
Long Strange TRIPs, supra note 29, at 1084 (implying that the immense frustration
regarding the delay exhibited by the developing nations evidenced their victory in
the negotiations).
107. See First Submission of the United States of America: India Patent Protec-
tion for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 1997 WL 113721, at
*1 (W.T.O. Mar. 6, 1997) (finding that India modified some of its legislation con-
cerning compulsory licenses for marketing of pharmaceuticals at the urging of the
United States); see also Gutowski, supra note 37, at 742 (noting that the India-
United States case was a landmark case because it was the first case to go through
the entire dispute resolution process of the wTO); Notification of a Mutually-
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tablish itself as a legitimate multilateral body, capable of impartial
dispute resolution mechanisms, 8 it would be a great mistake for the
DSB to yield to pressure from the pharmaceutical companies on
matters of compulsory licensing.'0 Yet, the WTO cannot assist a de-
veloping country to justify its issuance of compulsory licenses if the
developing nation maintains a submissive disposition toward harsh
political pressure from developed nations."' Therefore, the time is
ripe for the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism to decipher the
ambiguous terms that outline the legality of compulsory licenses un-
der TRIPs, Article 31. "'
Agreed Solution: Pakistan Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, 1997 WL 371039, at *1 (W.T.O. Mar. 7, 1997) (noting that the
United States and Pakistan arrived at a settlement on granting patents to relevant
pharmaceuticals and agricultural products). The United States convinced Pakistan
to prohibit the use of compulsory licenses for exclusive marketing rights under
certain criteria in that country. See id. at *2. The agreement materialized only after
Pakistan requested further consultations when the United States requested a WTO
panel investigation. See Gutowski, supra note 37, at 739.
108. See Hizon, supra note 9, at 122 (highlighting the new more litigious
method invoked by the WTO's DSU). The author notes that to ensure compliance
by Members to its decisions, the DSU has adopted a judicial quality of formality
and finality. See id. at 123; see also supra note 87 (stating the enhanced procedures
under the new DSB).
109. See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996) (noting
that, while NGO's are not allowed to participate in the work of the World Trade
Organization currently, they should be allowed to present the interests of the entire
world).
110. See Vicente, supra note 36, at 1108-10 (commenting on how the imposition
of unilateral sanctions by the United States under "Special 301" of the 1988 Trade
Act required Argentina to change its pharmaceutical patent policies above and be-
yond what TRIPs requires); see also Chang, supra note 30, at 230 (concluding that
the success of the TRIPs and the WTO depends upon whether developed nations
can abstain from imposing unilateral sanctions on nations to meet their standards
of intellectual property rights). But see John M. Wechkin, Comment, Drug Price
Regulation and Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents: The New Zea-
land Connection, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 237 (1995) (suggesting an alternative
solution to reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals in developing nations by imple-
menting price control measures).
111. See Review of TRIPs, supra note 4, at D7 (reporting that several developing
nations have called for clarifications of TRIPs by the WTO on the issue of compul-
sory licensing).
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III. THE POTENTIALLY WIDE RANGE OF
INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
IN ARTICLE 31
Without expressly defining the perimeters of the categories in Ar-
ticle 31, there is great room for different interpretation of the am-
biguous terms surrounding the issuance of compulsory licenses." 2 A
brief review of the specific objectives favored by the parties most
likely to bring the issue of compulsory licenses before the DSB could
help illuminate the possible scope of interpretation of the language in
TRIPs. 13 While developing countries are likely to favor a broad and
open interpretation of the conditions in Article 31, this perspective




Amidst the backdrop of multiple urgent problems present in de-
veloping nations, the leaders must develop a unique approach to
compulsory licensing. Taking into account their domestic laws con-
cerning intellectual property fights,"' it is realistic to expect that the
actions of developing nations will support the immediate concerns of
112. See Marschall, supra note 7, at 1189-90 (noting that the current TRIPs
agreement allows broad interpretation of compulsory licensing justifications due to
its ambiguous language).
113. See Gutowski, supra note 37, at 748-50 (setting forth the human rights de-
bate over intellectual property between developing nations and developed nations).
While developed nations believe that intellectual property indeed is a human right,
the perspective of many developing nations rejects that idea. See id. at 747. The
history in many developing nations encompassed a more communal approach to
development, allowing other pressing community concerns to trump individualistic
intellectual property rights. See id. at 747, 749.
114. See Chang, supra note 30, at 214-15 (noting the different intellectual prop-
erty values held by developing nations and developed nations). In many develop-
ing nations, the short-term benefits of compromising high intellectual property
standards are more apparent than any long-term benefits. See id. at 214.
115. See 2 Esm6 D. du Plessis & Blain M. de Villiers, International Laws and
Developments on Security hIterests in Intangible Assets: South 4frica, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: COMMERCIAL
EXPLOITATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY PROFILES 57.1-57.8 (Melvin Simen-
sky et al. eds.) (2d ed. 1999) (examining the intellectual property mechanisms in
the South African legal system).
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their population's needs in formulating a new policy."6
Developing nations are likely to argue for a broad interpretation to
pave the way for easier implementation of compulsory licensing."'
The arguments of developing nations facing staggering health chal-
lenges support the idea of morality in international trade practices.'"'
Developing nations generally believe that the economic injury com-
plained of by the pharmaceutical companies in developed nations
should have no bearing on the right to receive adequate health care.'"
For these nations, compulsory licenses should be available for any
health concern where there exists a pharmaceutical capable of either
curing or postponing the disease. 2 ° Thus, they believe that the moral
exception argument should dictate the broad use and implementation
of compulsory licenses under the TRIPs Article 31. 2'
116. See Chapter 2, sec. 27 Bill of Rights of Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (ensuring the right to have access to health care
services for South African citizens and mandating that the government must take
reasonable measures to realize this right). By placing health care within the Bill of
Rights, the South African government has an affirmative duty to protect the health
concerns of its population. See id.
117. See discussion supra Part.C.l (noting that developing nations have many
other challenges to concern themselves besides patents).
118. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property. Human Rights & Sover-
eignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indige-
nous Knowledge and the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59 (1998) (discussing the social justice implications of intellectual property
rights). But see Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs, supra note 29, at 1088 (noting
how the pharmaceutical industry created their moral twist on the intellectual prop-
erty debate by characterizing patents as "rights").
119. See Ford & Berman, supra note 53, at 3 (pronouncing the strong distaste
that physicians in developing nations have for the manipulated trade laws seeking
to place economic value of drugs over health of their patients); see also supra note
49 and accompanying text (outlining the language in the proposed South African
legislation, which notes that the main purpose behind the Amendment is to provide
adequate health services to its citizens).
120. See World Health Organization, Essential Drugs (visited Nov. 17, 1999)
<http://www.who.org/aboutwho/en/ensuring/essential.htm> (finding that the WHIO
Essential Drug Programme endeavors to "... . ensure that all people, wherever they
may be, are able to obtain the drugs they need at the lowest possible price; that
these drugs are safe, effective, and of high quality; and that they are prescribed and
used rationally").
121. See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading A wa
the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51, 60 (1999) (setting forth
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The justification for the developing nation's perspective would
likely arise out of the exclusions noted in Article 27 of TRIPs." Ar-
ticle 27 provides exceptions for patents in cases where Members
wish to protect public order and morality, including the protection of
human life.123 In this case, the purpose for utilizing compulsory li-
censes for AIDS pharmaceuticals is as simple as saving lives.'
In fact, this was the position that the South African government
adopted in the recent dispute.'" As mentioned earlier, the express
purpose of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amend-
ment Act was to protect the health of the public.' 6 Thus, as phrased,
it is impossible to divorce the Act's economic implications from its
moral imperative.'
two methods for breaking the tension between international economic policy and
trade policy by altering the current division of systems). The first suggestion is to
incorporate human rights into WTO trade agreements by amending the structure of
the WTO. See id. at 60. The second suggestion is to eliminate trade-related human
rights issues from WTO jurisdiction. See id. at 61.
122. See TRIPs, supra note 3, Part 1I, sec. 5, art. 27 (providing exceptions to the
patent enforcement outside of compulsory license provisions).
123. See id. TRIPs Part II, sec.5, art. 27. This provision reads:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, pro-
vided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.
Id.
124. See PhRMA: New Medicines, supra note 47 (highlighting the vast number
of new AIDS drugs being investigated for FDA approval and the effects of such
drugs on the lives of sufferers).
125. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
126. See supra Part I.C.2.b (discussing the South Africa's recent attempts to le-
galize compulsory licensing).
127. See Henry Anrys, Medical Ethics and Human Rights, in THE HUMAN
RIGHTS, ETHICAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH CARE: 120 PRACTICAL
CASE STUD. 55, 57 (European Network of Scientific Co-operation on Medicine
and Human Rights, 1998) (showing that a right to health often encompasses an
economic right to access to adequate resources by illustrating the ethical conflict in
the current AIDS epidemic). But see Garcia, supra note 121, at 52 (arguing that
tension between rigid moral entitlements and flexible economic rights presents an
increasing danger of undoing human rights-based justice).
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B. DEVELOPED NATIONS
On the other side of the debate, developed nations are likely to ar-
gue for a narrow interpretation to limit the use of compulsory li-
censes, especially for pharmaceuticals."8 Developed nations may be
fearful that even seemingly minor health risks will be interpreted as
extremely urgent, allowing for a wave of compulsory licenses for
pharmaceuticals.' 9 A massive tide of licenses certainly would ad-
versely impact the profits for the pharmaceutical industry, "' arguably
hurting the ability of those companies to research and develop any
new drugs.' Again, this is the position that the United States
adopted during the recent dispute with South Africa.'32 Yet, no de-
veloped nation wants to be placed in the situation of arguing that an
easily treated health concern is not an urgent concern for all of hu-
manity. "' Again, without knowing if "circumstances" or "purpose"
128. See 145 CONG. REC. H6027 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (noting how some
policymakers in the United States fear a slippery-slope effect of allowing compul-
sory licenses in developing nations).
129. See id. at 33 (quoting Rep. Callahan who asserts that the proposed amend-
ment, Section 15 (c) of the South Africa Medicines & Related Substances Act, cre-
ates a disturbing precedent for the deterioration of intellectual property rights in
South Africa).
130. See PhRMA, Backgrounders: What's At Stake in Seattle (visited Nov. 18,
1999) <http://www.phrma.org/facts/bkgrndr/seattle.html> (estimating that the
American pharmaceutical industry loses somewhere from $6 billion to $9 billion
each year due to international trade barriers like government intervention in the
marketplace and failure to protect intellectual property).
131. See PhRMA, PhRMA Policy Paper: Strong Patent Protection is Essential
(visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.phrma.org/issues/ protect> (asserting the
strong correlation between a system of pharmaceutical patent enforcement and the
ability of the pharmaceutical companies to engage in research and development
(R&D) of new drugs). See generally PhRMA, Priority Foreign Countries: South
Africa, Intellectual Property Protection <http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/
safrica.html> (visited Nov. 16, 1999) (discussing the PhRMA's perspective on the
recent trade dispute between the United States and South Africa).
132. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the many reasons that the
United States opposes compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, including the no-
tion that allowing them would undermine the traditional cycle of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry).
133. See Indonesia-Death Refugees: At Least 294 E. Timorese Died in East
Nusatenggara, ANTARA INDON. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinaf-




are meant to include broad concerns or very specific concerns, the
application of these provisions is difficult to ascertain.
' M
In addition, it is essential to note that the United States govern-
ment would not want to seem hypocritical by making blanket asser-
tions that compulsory licensing is illegal."' In the United States, the
Government reserves the right to issue compulsory licenses for prod-
ucts, including drugs, that it funds.'36 In addition, it allows for some
types of patent infringements under the doctrine of misuse.'
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Amidst the recent confusion, there is hope for solving the compul-
sory licensing dispute. With the DSB established to form legitimate
and binding decisions regarding TRIPs issues,' :8 an interpretation of
Article 31 could provide a compromise solution between both sides
134. See discussion supra Part I.C (debating the vast possibilities in interpreting
the TRIPs language).
135. See CPT's Letter to Cong. Black Caucus, supra note 60 (suggesting that the
United States and the EU would be hypocritical by insisting on an unconditional
rejection of compulsory licenses under Article 27 of TRIPs because both have
codified their own compulsory licensing schemes).
136. See March-in Rights, 35 U.S.C. sec. 203(l)(b) (1984) (limiting the scope of
patents created with federal assistance by reserving the right to grant a compulsory
license for the patent if it is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are
not being met by the patent-holder); see also 17 U.S.C. sec. 115 (1984) (outlining
the provisions for issuing compulsory licenses for phonorecords).
137. See Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
the criteria for applying the doctrine of misuse depends on whether the patentee's
"restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ven-
tured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an anti-competitive effect
not justifiable under the rule of reason"); see also Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doc-
trine Obsolete?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1922 (1997) (debating whether the equitable
doctrine of misuse should be replaced by reliance on antitrust laws, ultimately
postulating that a greater reliance on the misuse doctrine is preferred). But see
Theo Bodewig, On the Misuse of Intellectual Propery Rights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL COMPETITION: TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS, 247
(Horst Albach & Stephanie Rosenkranz eds., 1995) (establishing that, according to
the European Court of Justice, the denial of a license alone does not constitute
misuse). Yet, when a company participates in discriminatory practices designed to
prevent competitors from market access, the Court effectively has issued compul-
sory licenses for IBM products. See id. at 248-49.
138. See discussion supra note 12 (acknowledging recent criticisms of the
DSM).
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by balancing the scope of its application between broad moral inter-
ests and narrow protectionist interests.'3" Although the trade tensions
between developed and developing nations may neverfilly be elimi-
nated, a resolution of the compulsory licensing issue in Article 31 of
TRIPs may restore trust and encourage stronger trade relationships
between both sides.
A. THE NEED FOR DISPUTING PARTIES TO BRING THE ISSUE OF
COMPULSORY LICENSING BEFORE THE DSB
Because of the high stakes and increasing confusion involving
compulsory licensing, the time has come for disputing parties to
bring the issue of compulsory licensing before the WTO's DSB.' 40 It
is essential that parties debating the issue of compulsory licensing
bring the dispute before the DSB instead of continuing to rely on
diplomatic measures to resolve their disputes.' 4 ' Realistically, it is
apparent that developed nations have a much easier time relying on
their unilateral trade sanctioning measures to achieve their desired
results. 142 Developed nations are not likely, therefore, to risk a bind-
139. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (opining that striking a balance between
the needs of all nations is the best solution to maintain legitimacy for the WTO and
resolve future disputes).
140. Compare TRIPs, supra note 3, Part VI, art. 65, sec. 4 (suggesting that de-
veloping nations are immune from dispute settlement procedures for five years
from the signing of the Treaty), with id. art. 65, sec. 5 (mandating that a Member
who categorizes itself under the immunity in sec. 4 "shall ensure that any changes
in its laws, regulations and practice made during that period for not result in a
lesser degree of consistency with the provisions of [TRIPs]"). Thus, if the United
States truly believes that South Africa is breaching its obligations under TRIPs, it
could bring the matter before the DSB even if South Africa claimed its status was a
developing nation. See id. But see Pechman, supra note 30, at 202 (asserting that
by invoking unilateral measures through the Special 301, the United States may
violate the WTO Agreements). Thus, South Africa could bring the matter before
the DSB to allege illegal use of threatened unilateral trade sanctions of a matter
falling under the jurisdiction of the WTO. See generally id. at 206-07 (speculating
on the case of the United States being a defendant before the DSB).
141. See Nicole Telecki, Note, The Role of Special 301 in the Development of
International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights After the Uruguay Round,
14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 187, 215-18 (1996) (discussing how the United States assured
members of the DSU negotiations that it would utilize the DSB for resolution of
WTO issues, in exchange for the drafters to leave out a provision to prevent na-
tions from using unilateral means like the Special 301 to resolve WTO issues).
142. See Beeby Lewis, supra note 5, at 853-54 (exploring the success of bilat-
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ing negative decision by bringing the disputes before the DSB."' In-
deed, developing nations present the best chance for challenging
those unilateral measures.'" By bringing a compulsory licensing dis-
pute before the DSB, they stand to gain legitimacy in their compul-
sory licensing schemes and international recognition for paving the
road for other developing nations and potential trading partners to
create similar mechanisms.'4  The only potential harm in bringing the
matter before the DSB is the potential risk of damaging their rela-
tionships with important trading nations.'" Nonetheless, developing
nations have strong motivation for taking the lead on the compulsory
licensing issue.
B. THE DSB MUST REVIEW AND CLARIFY THE LANGUAGE IN
ARTICLE 31 OF TRIPs
The most practical method the WTO could implement to resolve
the current atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding compulsory li-
censing is for the DSB to clarify the language of the compulsory Ii-
eral trade negotiations for short term dispute settlements). The author cites a study
by the Institute for International Economics, reporting that the use of Special 301
has yielded at least partially successful outcomes in almost half the instances when
it was invoked. See id. at 853.
143. See id. at 854 (noting how bilateral negotiations are usually more efficient,
more timely, more flexible, and generally more beneficial for the United States).
144. See Pechman, supra note 30, at 206 (noting that under a stronger dispute
resolution system, developing nations may not be as intimidated from bringing
cases against developed nations before the DSB).
145. See Van Der Borght, supra note 12, at 1223, 1225 (relating how most WTO
members articulate their general overall satisfaction with the DSM). The author
notes how nations have found the system to be credible, predictable, impartial, and
objective, thus legitimizing the DSB's decisions for all parties involved in interna-
tional trade. See id. at 1225.
146. See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Industrial Property Rights and Private Sector
Development: Lessons for Developing Countries, in STRATEGIC ISSUES OF
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY: ABSTRACTS
& SELECTED PAPERS 23, 29 (Thomas Cottier et al., eds. 1999) (suggesting that
compliance with high standards of intellectual property protection will foster in-
creased trade in developing nations). Conversely, risking political relationships
may adversely affect trade relations between developing nations and their devel-
oped nation trading partners. See also discussion supra note 30 (exploring the
United States' liberal use of Special 301 and trade sanctions). But see Hizon, supra
note 9, at 126 (noting that although unilateral mechanisms still exist, that their use
will only undermine the philosophy of the multilateral WTO).
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censing provisions in Article 31 of TRIPs. 47 In doing so, the DSB
could either define the language in Article 31 as bright line language,
which sets a rigid standard of either a broad or narrow interpretation
for justifying the licenses, 141 or it could devise a compromise between
both sides by basing its interpretation of the ambiguous language in
Article 31 on the concept of "inadequate usage," enshrined in the
Paris Convention. 149 This would focus the DSB's decision on pro-
curing a strong definition of "inadequate usage" and would allow
subsequent decisions to be decided on a case-by-case analysis.' °
1. The Legitimacy of the DSB May Be at Risk by Assuming an
Extreme Position
The first option is to take an extreme position by implementing a
hard line approach, which would encourage criticism over the DSB's
role as an impartial multilateral agency. Under the first option, the
WTO could implicate a very strict interpretation of Article 31 and
rule that any exceptions for compulsory licenses must not prejudice
the rights of the patent holder, as deemed reasonable by the patent-
holder.'' This would likely trigger the denunciation of TRIPs by
many developing nations.' 2 On the other side, the WTO liberally
could allow compulsory licensing under Article 31 .' Additionally,
147. See Hizon, supra note 9, at 124 (noting how the member nations of the
WTO have legitimized the DSB by bringing a substantial number of trade disputes
before it to be settled).
148. See Vienna Convention, supra note 69 (noting the exact manner in which
treaty language should be interpreted). But see Marschall, supra note 7, at 1190
(opining that the best solution to resolving the problem of ambiguous language in
Article 31 is to limit the use of compulsory licensing to instances of antitrust or
anticompetition violations).
149. See supra notes 77, 78 and accompanying text (exploring the room for in-
terpretation of "inadequate usage" in the Paris Convention).
150. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the need for a strong, but bal-
anced approach to defining "inadequate usage").
151. See infira note 157 and accompanying text (examining how the narrow in-
terpretation of language like "inadequate usage" that outlines the purpose of issu-
ing compulsory licenses may affect the broader decision regarding the legality of
compulsory licenses).
152. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting the fragile acceptance of TRIPs
by developing nations).
153. See WTO Appellate Body Report on the United States-Standards For Re-
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this would risk its stance as a multilateral agency, for developed na-
tions would likely pursue other bilateral options rather than allow the
WTO to decide matters.'
2. Striking a Balance Between the Needs of Both Developing and
Developed Countries is the Best Approach
The best alternative for the DSB in determining limits for allowing
compulsory licenses is to first suggest specific criteria that it will use
in calculating the legitimacy of a nation's purpose for using compul-
sory licensing, by balancing the interests of both developed and de-
veloping nations."' As noted earlier, the Paris Convention allowed
compulsory licenses in situations where the patent-holder was inade-
quately utilizing those rights within another country.'" If this is still
the case under TRIPs, then the WTO needs to define what it consid-
ers to be "inadequate usage."' : The question remains whether "in-
formulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WTfDS2/AB!R, at 48 (Apr. 29,
1996) (establishing the ability for developing nations to prevail within the DSM
system); see also Beatrice Chaytor, Dispute Settlement Under the G.7,TT/WTO: the
Experience of Developing Nations, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 250, 264 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998) [herein-
after DISPUTE RESOLUTION] (finding the increased number of developing nations
winning their cases against developed nations, opining that the Re/brnulated
Gasoline case signified a new era of equality for the interests of developing nations
in international trade).
154. See Pechman, supra note 30, at 199 (noting that the current concessions
given by TRIPs to developing nations already provoke the United States to rely
more on its bilateral trade bullying techniques like Special 301 ).
155. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 3(7) (articulating that the DSB's primary focus
is to find a solution beneficial to all parties: "A solution mutually acceptable to the
parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be pre-
ferred").
156. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 90 (articulating that the principle justifica-
tion for compulsory licensing in the Paris Convention is the inadequate usage of a
patent).
157. See Ned Milenkovich, Comment, Deleting the Bolar -mendnent to the
Hatch-Waxinan Act: Harmonizing Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in a Global
Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 21-22 (1999) (establishing how the DSB may
interpret TRIPs under three categories, including: intellectual property rights con-
ventions incorporated into TRIPs; rules specific to TRIPs; and rules in TRIPs taken
from other conventions). Since TRIPs does not mention the term "inadequate us-
age", it must look to the Paris Convention, which is also vague. See discussion su-
pra Part II.A (discussing terms in the Paris Convention regarding compulsory li-
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adequate usage" includes instances when a patent holder, like a
pharmaceutical company, does not market a drug in a specific coun-
try because the cost-benefit analysis would not yield a favorable re-
sult and would harm the company. In addition, it is unclear whether
"inadequate usage" includes instances where the pharmaceutical
company does market a drug in a developing country, but keeps the
prices high and unaffordable to a majority of the population. ' 5 With-
out guidelines for interpretation, the meaning of "inadequate usage"
remains unclear.
A compromise between these definitions suggests the best option
is to balance the interests of both developed and developing na-
tions." 9 The WTO should permit compulsory licenses for cases of
"inadequate usage" of all pharmaceutical patents for drugs used to
treat life-threatening diseases, which affect a significant portion of a
nation's citizens and are not available to those affected through the
current market practices." Although this may raise questions con-
cerning what constitutes a life threatening disease, 6 ' the burden will
be on the license-seeking nation to prove the relevant circumstances.
Furthermore, using this definition of "inadequate usage" would de-
fine the concepts of "national emergency" or "case of extreme ur-
censing).
158. See The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act-
Chapter Seventeen: Intellectual Property, A(5) (1993) (defining the requirement to
"work" a patent under NAFTA as satisfied when a patented product is merely im-
ported into a country). Thus, it is likely that developed nations would take a con-
versely narrow approach to what constitutes "inadequate usage."
159. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (highlighting the need for the
DSB to devise a compromise in the spirit of keeping a "proper balance between the
rights and obligations of members").
160. See Garcia, supra note 121, at 63 (opining that international economic law
must defer to international human rights on some levels, including rights involving
life and freedom).
161. See E. Timorese, supra note 133 (describing how many E. Timorese died
of respiratory illness and diarrhea). But see World Health Organization, The World
Health Report 1999: Mortality By Sex, Cause, and WHO Region (visited Nov. 16,
1999) 1 <http://www. who.org/whr/1999/en/pdf/mortality.pdf> (calculating that
4.8% of the population of low and middle income WHO member states died of di-
arrhea in 1998, and that only .1% of the population in high income member states
died of the same disease). This shows that what may be considered a dangerous
and deadly disease in one nation may not be considered a threat in another nation,
due to access to medications. See id.
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gency" noted in Article 31 (b). 2
3. Approaching Royalties Through Consensus is the Most
Realistic Approach
To satisfy developed nations and their industries that stand to lose
a great deal of money from such practices, " ' the WTO should require
a consensus from both sides as to the duration of the license and the
royalties to be paid to the patent-holder.'" While some scholars have
asserted that it only makes sense for the sum of royalties to be de-
termined by the developing ation, this is an idealistic approach. In
order to satisfy the concerns of politically powerful pharmaceutical
companies in developed nations, it is imperative to offer some con-
cession.166 In order to prevent the risk of negotiations wasting vali-
162. See BLAKENEY, supra note 5, at 91 (noting that it was initially suggested by
the United States that the exception should read "declared national emergency").
While this would make the definition more clear-cut, it would still be subject to the
decisions of each nation's government whether such a declaration was necessary.
See also Chapter 2, sec. 37 Bill of Rights of Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act 108 of 1996 (restricting the invocation of a declared state of emer-
gency). It is important to note that some nations, like South Africa, restnct the
declaration of a state of emergency to protect its citizens from the human rights
abuses that were allowed historically under such a declaration. See Nicholas
Haysom, Emergency, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITLTION:
COMMENTARY & CASES 321, 325 (Nicholas Haysom et al. eds.. 1997) (articulating
how specific provisions for declared states of emergency under the new South Af-
rican Constitution were necessary to protect citizens from arbitrary acts, such as
martial law and extra-judicial killings).
163. See AIDS Drugs Policy: Africa Policy, hiforniation Center, supra note 21
(pointing out that whether the pharmaceutical companies stand to lose money in
developing countries is arguable, since they do not profit much with their current
high prices).
164. See BODEWIG, supra note 137, at 249-50 (noting that the European Court
of Justice has interpreted excessively high royalties and royalties extending for an
excessive time period to be a violation of intellectual property rights under the
misuse doctrine). This may serve as a deterrent to patent-holders attempting to
spoil negotiations by insisting on unreasonably high royalties.
165. See Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs. supra note 29, at 1114 (noting that
logic dictates the developing country, or the country in need of the license, should
dictate the value of the compulsory license because if it were the other way around,
the patent holder would issue the license without compulsion).
166. See AIDS Drugs Policy: Africa Policy Informatton Center, supra note 21
(noting that pharmaceutical companies urgently insist that they require cash flows
to fuel the research and development schemes to develop more pharmaceuticals).
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able time and money to both sides, the final decision on royalties will
be left with the WTO's DSB.167 Thus, if the sides do not quickly
come to a resolution on the matter within a specific time restraint,
each side should be required to submit a proposal to the DSB. At that
juncture, the WTO would formulate a fair decision.'68
CONCLUSION
While the framers of TRIPs may have believed at the time that the
issue of compulsory licenses was well defined, the opposing per-
spectives are bound to face off at some point in the near future. It is
essential that the WTO is prepared to handle the matter quickly and
efficiently, as the issue of compulsory licenses is of great concern to
those standing to lose immense sums of money in the pharmaceutical
industry and, more importantly, by those who await medical treat-
ments for life-threatening diseases in developing nations. Although
the recent tensions between the United States and South Africa have
been temporarily resolved, it took two and a half years for both sides
to settle the dispute. Now is the time for the WTO to embrace the is-
sue of compulsory licensing and take necessary steps to assure both
sides of the debate that reasonable solutions can be made through the
DSU.
Interestingly, the article notes that the two most controversial AIDS pharmaceuti-
cals to be considered for compulsory licensing were created at the National Insti-
tute of Health with taxpayer funds. See id.
167. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 3(3). The DSU provision notes that regarding
the resolution of disputes:
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that
any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agree-
ments are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is es-
sential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a
proper balance between the rights and obligations of members.
Id.
168. See John H. Jackson, The WHO Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 69, 73 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell
eds., 1998) (noting that while a decision by the DSB may not necessarily be
"binding" in the traditional sense, the decisions by the DSB do create an interna-
tional law obligation to perform the act proscribed in the decision).
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